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Abstract
Historical evidence from the developed world suggests that the expansion of the mod-
ern states’ fiscal capacity (i. e. its ability to tax citizens) eventually led to more democratic
and less corrupt governments. Since sub-Saharan African countries are currently in a pro-
cess of state building, we study whether a positive effect of fiscal capacity on government
accountability prevails in contemporaneous sub-Saharan Africa, too. We conduct the em-
pirical analysis with data covering 23 African countries over the 1960-2008 period. The
results suggest that fiscal capacity increases government accountability in sub-Saharan
Africa.
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1 Introduction
The ultimate measure of the state’s power is its fiscal capacity: the amount and type of
resources it has at its disposal. Some authors even define the state in terms of its ability to
acquire revenues. The 16th century philosopher Jean Bodin stated that “financial means are
the nerves of the state”. More recently, Douglass North described the state as an organization
whose geographic boundaries are determined by its power to tax (North, 1981).
It is well known that a powerful state can be a mixed blessing. Countries with a powerful
state that respects property rights and provides important public goods tend to be rich. In
contrast, countries with predatory states tend to be poor.1 Therefore, the challenge every
society faces is to provide the state with the means to fulfill its legitimate duties, while at the
same time preventing it from misusing its power to expropriate private resources. Countries
that have been successful in sustaining high levels of fiscal/state capacity have typically found
a solution to this challenge. By establishing an extensive bureaucracy that has the ability to
monitor and tax the economic transactions of its citizens, such countries provide the state with
the administrative means to extract large amounts of resources from the private sector. At
the same time, they have established institutional barriers, from democratically accountable
parliaments to the separation of powers, that commit the state to be accountable to its
citizens.
This combination of administrative capability and institutional limitations has guaranteed
a high degree of voluntary tax compliance (Andreoni et al., 1998; Frey and Torgler, 2007),
thereby limiting monitoring and collection costs. It follows from this observation that to
increase taxation, rulers not only built capable tax administrations, but were also forced to
become more accountable. By most accounts, they progressively allowed citizens to partic-
ipate in the formulation of public policy, established efficient bureaucracies, and subjected
themselves to the rule of law.
1Leeson (2007) illustrates this fact on the basis of the experiences in Somalia. He shows that in this country,
measures of social welfare improved after the collapse of state structures. His explanation for this finding is
that Somalian governments did more harm than good to their citizens, so that, from the citizen’s point of
view, anarchy was preferable to a state that was excessively predatory.
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Historical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the building of the accountable
state and the expansion of its fiscal capacity were related developments. Attempts by the
state to increase taxation were often met with resistance by citizens and demands for a
voice in the formulation of public polices and/or for less corrupt administration. Often cited
examples are the American rebellion against the British with its goal to prevent “taxation
without representation”, the convocation of the Estates-General by Louis XVI to address
the financial difficulties of the absolutist state, and the repeated struggles between British
monarchs and Parliament to gain control over tax policy. In all these cases, significant limits
on the power of the state were put in place after the state had acquired the institutional
capability and displayed the willingness to increase levels of taxation. Moreover, in many
modern countries, the most important role of parliament is to approve the budget, to decide
on new taxes, and to hold the executive accountable to the public.
Even though historians and political scientists have argued for a long time that fiscal
capacity leads eventually to more accountable governments (Tilly, 1992; Moore, 2007), the
economics literature has paid little attention to this direction of causality. Democracy and
the quality of government are usually perceived as having an exogenous effect on taxation
and public good provision. The reverse relationship, i. e. an independent effect of taxation
on the accountability of the state tends to be neglected.2
There are, however, a few exceptions that quantitatively analyze the effect of fiscal capacity
and/or related variables on government accountability. Ross (2004) explores how taxation
affects representation for a large number of countries with pooled cross-section regressions.
Similarly, Herb (2005) explores the relationship between non-tax revenues and democracy in
a cross-country sample. Berger (2009) finds that in Nigeria, subnational regions where the
British colonialists had invested in fiscal capacity during colonial period tend to have better
2For example, one major strand of the literature in political economy argues that democracy enables poor
voters to enforce redistributive policies, and through this channel increases the tax burden (for a review, see
Gould and Baker (2002)). The best known contribution along these lines is probably Meltzer and Richard
(1981), who use the median voter model to explain levels of redistribution. Another strand of the literature
explores how corruption and other measures of the quality of government influence fiscal polices. For example,
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) show that the efficacy of public spending is dependent on the quality of gov-
ernment. Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) study theoretically how redistributive interventions of the government
affect corruption and through this channel the size of government. However, neither strand of the literature
explores the possibility that democracy and the quality of government itself may be a function of taxation.
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governments and higher administrative quality. In addition, there exists a large literature
on the “resource curse” which finds that countries that receive large incomes from natural
resources are less democratic and exhibit lower government quality (Ross, 2001; Treisman,
2007). Similarly, several contributions find that development aid, which is another source of
non-tax income, has a detrimental effect on government quality (Knack, 2001, 2004). None of
these studies, however, explicitly investigate the implications of fiscal capacity on government
accountability.
Given, on the one hand, the contributions suggesting an independent effect of fiscal capacity
on government accountability, and, on the other hand, the scarcity of econometric evidence
that is concerned with this direction of causality, the goal of this paper is to study whether
fiscal capacity has an effect on government accountability.
We explore this question using data from 23 sub-Saharan African countries over the 1960-
2008 period. Several authors argue that sub-Saharan Africa is currently in a process of state
building that is similar to the establishment of the modern state in the Europe (Kirby and Ward,
1991; Thies, 2004). African countries also vary considerably in their fiscal capacities (Di John,
2009) and in their levels of democracy and government quality (Wiseman, 1995). Therefore,
they provide a promising testing ground. In addition, studying the link between fiscal capac-
ity and accountability can lead to insights that may help to formulate development strategies
for this part of the world. Indeed, the link between government accountability and taxation in
sub-Saharan Africa has received some attention in recent development policy debates (Olson,
2001).
Following our previous discussion, we understand in this paper the term accountability as
encompassing two distinct dimensions. A political dimension which relates to the ability of
the citizens to influence policy through the ballot box (democracy), and an administrative
dimension which captures to what extent the institutions of the state are efficient, free of
corruption, and subject to the rule of law (quality of government).
We begin our empirical investigation by using the instrumental variables approach to iden-
tify the effect of fiscal capacity on the two dimensions of accountability. The instrumental
variables approach is commonly applied to identify the effect of fiscal capacity on some vari-
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able of interest. For example, (Dinecco and Prado, 2010) use this approach to study the
effect of fiscal capacity on economic growth. As suggested by the recent theoretical litera-
ture on fiscal capacity, such studies use variables based on historical international wars as
instruments. The reason is that because states have to expend considerable resources to fight
wars, those countries that were often engaged in warfare in the past had to expand their fiscal
capacity (Besley and Persson, 2009a). Consequently, one may expect a correlation between
the incidence and severity of past international wars and contemporaneous fiscal capacity.
Indeed, Dinecco and Prado (2010) show in a world-wide sample that the number of histori-
cal war casualties a country has suffered in international wars is strongly correlated with its
contemporaneous fiscal capacity.
However, in the African context, historical international war casualties cannot be used as
an instrument because international wars have been rare in Africa, even after decolonization.
We decided that the best alternative war-based instruments are the number of wars fought by
a colonizing power against native populations in the territory of a contemporaneous African
country and the casualties suffered by this power during these wars. We use these instruments
based on the premise that if a colonizing power had to fight a many wars and/or suffered high
casualties during the colonization process, then it would perceive the colonized tribe/kingdom
as a serious threat. Therefore, it would have an incentive to build up its fiscal capacity in
order to have sufficient resources available to keep the native population under control.
The results of the instrumental variables regressions suggest that there is a positive re-
lationship between certain proxies for fiscal capacity and the two dimensions of government
accountability. However, diagnostic tests for the suitability of the instruments in these regres-
sions suggest that historical war-casualties based instruments are problematic when used in
the context of sub-Saharan Africa. We find that the weak identification statistics are low and
that we cannot exclude the possibility that the instruments are correlated with the error term
in the second stage regressions. Even though the instrumental variables regressions exhibit
these problems, we decided to report the results since instrumental variables regressions are
the standard approach used in the literature to study the implications of fiscal capacity.
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Yet, we use in a second step approaches that rely on the temporal dimension of our data
to identify the effect fiscal capacity on government accountability. More specifically, we first
estimate models where we explain levels of accountability at the end of our sample period with
levels of fiscal capacity at the beginning. Second, we attempt to explain long-run changes in
accountability with initial levels of fiscal capacity. Finally, we fully exploit the panel structure
of our dataset and estimate System-GMM models using five- and ten-year averaged data. In
these models, we explain levels of accountability in the contemporaneous five- or ten-year
period, respectively, by the level of fiscal capacity in the previous five- or ten-year period.
On balance, our results suggest, in line with the instrumental variables regressions, that
there is a positive relationship between certain measures of fiscal capacity and both dimensions
of government accountability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a short
description of the fiscal systems of African countries and discusses their potential link with
government accountability. Section 3 introduces the data. Sections 4 to 6 present the results.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Fiscal capacity and government accountability in sub-Saharan
Africa
In this paper, we are interested in the implications of the state’s fiscal capacity for government
accountability. What is meant by the term fiscal capacity is the extractive capability of the
state, i. e. the amount and type of resources the state could theoretically extract if it chose
to do so, and the extent to which this extraction can be done “efficiently”. This hypothetical
power is, of course, not measurable. What can be done is to infer upon this power through
observable proxy variables. The most widely used are the tax to GDP ratio and the share
of income taxes in total tax revenue (Besley and Persson, 2009a; Dinecco and Prado, 2010).
The tax to GDP ratio can thought of as measuring the total extractive capability of the state.
The share of income taxes in total tax revenues measures the extent to which revenues are
raised through the relatively advanced and efficient income tax.
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Using these proxies, we find that there are noticeable differences in fiscal capacity between
African countries, both with respect to the overall tax intake and with respect to the compo-
sition of revenues. According to the World and African Development Indicators (see below
for a description of these data), Namibia had on average a tax to GDP ratio of 28% dur-
ing the 1960-2008 period, whereas the Democratic Republic of Congo had a ratio of 1.2%.
With respect to the composition of revenues, Botswana collected over 57% of its revenue from
relatively advanced taxes on income and profits, while Guinea only collected around 10%.
Several explanations have been put forward for these differences. First, economic factors
have been mentioned. Di John (2009), for example, relates the capacity to tax, inter alia,
to the share of subsistence agriculture in total output, the size of the informal sector, the
number of small establishments, and the share of total consumer spending made in modern
establishments.
Second, it is argued that the differences in fiscal capacity can be explained by the colonial
past. According to Amin (1972), African countries can be divided in three groups: the Africa
of (i) the cash-crop economies, (ii) the concessionary companies, and (iii) the labor reserves.
In the cash-crop economies, productions was left to peasants while marketing was dominated
by mercantile houses or state marketing boards. In the Africa of the concessionary companies,
colonial powers gave concessions to private companies for the extraction of minerals and the
production of crops on large plantations. The labor reserves colonies had a large settler
population, whereas the native inhabitants were used as cheap labor. Amin argues that non-
labor reserves economies tended to rely more on trade taxes. The labor-reserves economies,
on the other hand, were characterized by a small foreign minority that was pitted against a
large native population, which motivated the ruling elite to accept high tax rates.
On the one hand, it is a reasonable conjecture that the fiscal infrastructure left in place
by the colonizers has had an effect on the development paths of African countries (Olsson,
2009). On the other hand, most African countries have been independent for around 50
years by now and consequently have had time to shape their own tax policies. That they
are capable to formulate their own polices and are not exclusively bound by the colonial past
is, for example, shown by Kasara (2007). She finds that taxation of agricultural products
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within African countries varies according to whether a particular product is produced in a
region dominated by co-ethnics of the chief executive. Similarly, Block (2002) shows that
governments in Africa use fiscal policy strategically to affect election outcomes. African
countries therefore have some leverage regarding their tax policies, and it is a reasonable
conjecture that their decisions regarding taxation will eventually impact levels of democracy
and the quality of government.
That the effect of taxation on representation found in Europe has, at least historically,
also existed in Africa is hinted by several rebellions by African kingdoms/tribes against taxes
imposed by the colonial authorities. One straightforward example is the Hut Tax War in
present-day Sierra Leone. After the British unilaterally imposed a tax on the size of huts, a
collection of local tribes rose up in rebellion (Abraham, 1972, 1974). This unwillingness to
pay taxes may force African rulers, as in Europe at the dawn of the modern age, to grant
citizens a larger say in policy and provide them with better quality government, at least if
other revenue sources are unavilable.
Yet, there are also reasons to be skeptical that the link between fiscal capacity and account-
ability exists in Africa. One the one hand, unlike European countries, most modern African
states receive significant amounts of natural resource income and large sums of development
aid. Income from natural resources implies that governments are not dependent on negoti-
ating with their populace for revenues. The availability of such rent income may therefore
diminish the link between taxation and accountability in Africa (Ross, 2004). Similarly, de-
velopment aid represents a source of income to African rulers which frees them from the need
to form an implicit social contract with their citizens, offering more democracy and better
governance in return for more taxes (Moss et al., 2006; Brautigam et al., 2008). On the other
hand, rulers have to engage with donors if they want to receive aid, which might provide a
counter-weight against predatory behavior. Thus, while aid might diminish the link between
fiscal capacity and accountability, its implications as a whole for accountability may not be
as bad as that of rent income.
Another feature of the contemporaneous fiscal landscape in Africa is the emergence of
autonomous revenue authorities (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009). These are revenue collection
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institutions that operate independently from the finance ministries. The idea behind their es-
tablishment was to de-politicize tax administration and to make it more efficient, in particular
by paying higher salaries than in other branches of the public sector. While it is contentious
whether these revenue authorities have indeed improved the quality of tax administration,
the fact that they are only indirectly accountable to the finance ministry and other politi-
cal institutions may mean that their emergence may have weakened the link between fiscal
capacity and accountability.
Finally, the historical narratives relating taxation to representation usually involve the
existence of an external threat to the state (Besley and Persson, 2009a,b). In other words, it
is argued that governments started to require higher taxes only because they had to fight wars
against other states. In Africa, however, there have been few wars where nation states fought
other states.3 Therefore, it may be argued that African countries never had an incentive to
invest in their extractive capabilities. On the other hand, wars are not the only reason why
public officials may want to raise revenues. Also, the fact that only few actual wars were
fought does not imply that African governments did not perceive external threats (Thies,
2007). The potential for an external war may have been sufficient to incentivize them to
invest in their fiscal capacities, even if only few actual wars have been fought.
Overall, there are some reasons why we should expect an effect of fiscal capacity on gov-
ernment accountability in contemporaneous Africa, and others that suggest that this link
may either not be present or are ambiguous about the direction of the exact nature of the
relationship. Therefore, it is essentially an empirical question whether and how fiscal capacity
and accountability are related in Africa. In the next sections, we explore this question.
3 Data
The first issue that needs to be addressed when attempting to empirically analyze the re-
lationship between fiscal capacity and accountability is to find accurate measures for both.
Useful proxies for fiscal capacity should capture the amount of revenues the state can collect,
3Herbst (2000) mentions in particular geographical and demographic conditions as impediments to interstate
wars in Africa. Low population density combined with inaccessible territories made it both difficult and
relatively unattractive to gain control over large territories in the hinterland.
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if it choose to do so, and to what extent these revenues are collected through “advanced”
revenue sources. For example, revenues obtained from rent income or development aid can be
used to provide public goods, and as such can be interpreted as an indicator of fiscal capacity,
but collecting such revenues requires neither a complex bureaucracy nor the compliance of
citizens with the tax authorities. On the other hand, collection of income taxes requires both
an advanced bureaucracy and the compliance of citizens, but revenues from income taxes
alone might be insufficient to fund the variety of public goods that is expected from the state.
Besley and Persson (2009a) and Dinecco and Prado (2010) use the share of income taxes
in total tax revenues as their first measure of fiscal capacity, arguing that the importance
of income taxes is a good proxy for the capacity of the tax administration. Second, they
use the tax to GDP ratio as a “catch-all” measure of fiscal capacity. Third, they use the
share of non-trade taxes in total tax revenue, arguing that trade taxes are inefficient and that
therefore a large trade tax share indicates low fiscal capacity.
We follow these authors and use the share of income taxes in total tax revenues and the
tax to GDP ratio as our first two indicators of fiscal capacity. However, while the share of
non-trade taxes is a reasonable measure of fiscal capacity, the non-grant share of revenues
(grants from other foreign governments, international organizations, etc.) appears to be more
appropriate for African countries given the important role of development aid for public
budgets in many sub-Saharan African countries. Knack (2009) shows that aid is negatively
related to the efficiency of the tax system. Also, Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) show that
poorer countries have not been able to replace revenue losses due to trade liberalization,
which suggests that small revenues from trade taxes may rather indicate low instead of high
fiscal capacity in the African context. For these reasons, we use the non-grant share in total
revenues as our third measure of fiscal capacity in this paper.
We collected data on the share of income taxes in total tax revenue, the tax to GDP ratio,
and the share of non-grant revenue in total revenues primarily from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators dataset (WDI), which provides observations from the 1960s onwards.
Whenever the WDI data exhibit missing values, we replace the values with the data provided
in the African Development Indicators (ADI) if the ADI data is available. The ADI data is
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only available from the 1990s onwards, but is more complete during this period than the WDI
data.4
As with fiscal capacity, we have to operationalize the concept of accountability. One impor-
tant dimension of accountability is to what extent the government is politically accountable to
its citizens, i. e . if it can be voted out of office if it implements polices that are not supported
by the majority of the population. This aspect of accountability can be summarized under
the heading “democracy”. A second dimension of accountability is the quality of government,
i. e. whether or not the government is corrupt, whether the bureaucracy is meritocratic, and
whether property rights are secure. These two dimensions of accountability are not necessar-
ily related, i. e. democratic governments are not necessarily less corrupt and vice versa. We
thus use separate measures for the two dimensions of accountability.
Several organization provide measures that attempt to empirically operationalize the ab-
stract concepts of democracy and government quality. They differ not only with respect to
the definitions that are applied, but also with respect to coverage and construction. Widely
used measures for democracy are constructed by the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers,
2002), Freedom House, theWorld Bank (the “voice and accountability” measure), and Vanhanen
(2003). Similarly, widely used measures to capture the quality of government are available
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of the PRS Group, the World Bank, and
Transparency International.
In this paper, we use the combined polity score from the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers,
2002) to measure democracy, i. e. our first dimension of government accountability. Its ad-
vantage is that it is, for the countries in our sample, available from the beginning of the 1960s,
and thus reaches further back than any other measure. The combined polity score can assume
values from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).
To measure the second dimension of accountability, the quality of government, we use the
quality of government index from the ICRG. This measure has the advantage, compared to
the alternatives, that it provides consistent information over a relatively long time-frame, i. e.
4The correlation between the WDI and ADI values, when both are available, is over 0.85 for the income
tax and the tax/GDP ratio. The correlation coefficient is lower, i. e. 0.61, for non-grant ratio. Note, however,
that there are only 38 jointly defined observations for the non-grant ratio in the WDI and ADI datasets.
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from 1984 onwards. The quality of government score can assume values between 0 (lowest
quality) to 1 (highest quality), and takes into account the degree of corruption, the extent to
which “law and order” prevail, and the bureaucratic quality.
Our final dataset consists of 23 sub-Saharan countries, listed in Table 1, for which ob-
servations are jointly available for the three measures of fiscal capacity and two measures
of accountability. Even though our sample is limited to only about half of the countries
located in sub-Saharan Africa, it should be reasonably representative. It covers all major
regions of this part of the world and includes large and small, rich and poor, and English and
French-speaking countries.
In Figure 1, we plot the average value of our proxy for democracy, the combined polity
score, during the sample period against the average value of each of the three measures of fiscal
capacity for the 23 countries. This figure reveals, first, a strong positive linear relationship
between the income tax ratio and the polity score, and second, an equally strong positive
relationship between the tax to GDP ratio and the polity score. It is noteworthy that these
positive relationships are not driven by only a few outliers. On the other hand, there does
not seem to be any relationship between the non-grant ratio and the proxy for democracy.
In Figure 2, we plot the average value of the ICRG index, our measure for the quality of
government, against the average value of each of the three measures of fiscal capacity. We
find a positive relationship between the quality of government index and both the income tax
and the tax to GDP ratios, but no relationship between the non-grant ratio and the quality
of government. As for democracy, these findings do not seem to be driven by outliers.
Obviously, the findings from these figures can only be preliminary as they neither control
for any covariates nor take account of potential endogeneity between the measures for fiscal
capacity and government accountability. Yet, they suggest that the non-grant share and
the other two measures of fiscal capacity have different implications for accountability. The
correlation coefficients for the cross-section averages reported in Table 3 provide a reasonable
explanation for the differing effects of the non-grant ratio and the other two measures of
fiscal capacity. They show that the three measures of fiscal capacity are positively correlated.
However, the correlation between the non-grant ratio variable with the other two is relatively
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weak. Overall, this suggests that the three proxies capture different aspects of fiscal capacity,
which are not necessarily related.
The correlations reported in Table 3 also show that the democracy and quality of govern-
ment indices capture similar, but not entirely identical, aspects of accountability. On average,
more democratic countries tend to have higher quality governments and vice versa, but the
correlation is around 0.7 and hence far from perfect.
Finally, we provide some summary statistics on the cross-section averages of the variables
used in the regressions in Table 4. They reveal that there is considerable variation between the
23 countries in both fiscal capacity and accountability. The country average of the combined
polity score ranges from -7.8 to + 6.8, and the quality of government variable ranges from 0.1
to 0.7. Similarly, the share of income taxes in total tax revenue ranges from 10.5% to 57.8%,
the tax to GDP ratio from 1.2% to 28.2%, and the non-grant share of revenues from 27% to
92%.
4 Instrumental variables estimation
We start the empirical analysis by estimating a model where we regress the two measures of
government accountability on the three measures of fiscal capacity while attempting to take
potential endogeneity of the latter into account. In other words, we estimate
Accountabilityi = c+ αFiscal capacityi + δxi + ǫi, (1)
where Accountability refers either to democracy, measured by the combined polity score,
or to the quality of government, measured by the ICRG quality of government index; Fiscal
capacity is the country’s fiscal capacity, measured either as the income tax ratio, the tax/GDP
ratio, or the non-grant ratio; c is the constant, x is a vector of control variables (see below),
and ǫ the error term. All variables are included as cross-section averages.5
5The time-dimensions for which data are available vary between variables. In particular, the ICRG quality
of government index is only available for the 1984-2008 period. All other variables are, at least for some
countries, available for the period 1960-2008 (but there are several missing variables in the case of the proxies
for fiscal capacity). The only exception is one element of the x vector: GDP per capita, for which our data
covers the 1960-2007 period.
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Since we have only 23 observations, we have to be conservative in the number of control
variables. The vector x therefore consists of three variables only: the log of GDP per capita,
the urbanity ratio and the share of the under-24 year old. All three variables can be perceived
as capturing various socio-economic determinants of accountability. GDP per capita is likely
to be correlated with the educational level of the population, which in turn is likely to be
related to democracy. In addition, it is a reasonable conjecture that the richer a society is,
the more people can afford to invest time and resources to participate in the political process.
The urbanity ratio is likely to be correlated with the ability of the population to participate
in the political process as well. First, by making it easier to organize political action. Second,
by bringing citizens more closely to the centers of political power, i. e. the large cities. Finally,
young people are often those fueling demands for more democracy. On the other hand, there
is also evidence that the likelihood of violent conflict is higher if a society is too young (UNDP,
2006).
We use the instrumental variables approach to take account of the endogeneity between
accountability and fiscal capacity. Besley and Persson (2009a) argue that past external wars
can be used as instruments for fiscal capacity. Dinecco and Prado (2010) show that past
external war casualties perform well as instruments in a world-wide sample. However, past
external wars, i. e. where two nation states confronted each other, cannot be reasonably
used in sub-Saharan Africa because most modern African states were only formed during
the decolonization process. In fact, even during the post-colonial period, external wars have
been rare in Africa. Except for the two World Wars, the Correlates of War database (version
3) records only one external war in sub-Saharan Africa before 1945, and two external wars
thereafter.
As an alternative to external wars, we use information on what the Correlate of War
database calls extra-state wars, i. e. wars fought between states and non-state actors that are
not civil wars. Extra-state wars refer to, for example, wars between a colonial power and
native populations.
We calculated the number of wars fought between African pre-colonial kingdoms/tribes
and colonial powers before 1945 and the total casualties of the colonizing power using the
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Correlates of War database. We then mapped the respective kingdoms/tribes to contempo-
raneous countries, and used the number of wars and the aggregated casualties suffered by the
colonizing power as instruments for current fiscal capacity of a given African country (see also
the data appendix).
In the non-African context, the number of casualties suffered by a country (or its pre-
decessors) is usually proposed as instrument for that country (Besley and Persson, 2009a;
Dinecco and Prado, 2010). However, in sub-Saharan Africa, data on casualties suffered by
a given kingdom/tribe in wars with colonizing powers is often unavailable, forcing us to use
casualties by the colonizing power instead. But while it would be preferable to have, for com-
parative purposes, data on casualties suffered by African kingdoms/tribes, casualties suffered
by the colonizing power might actually be a better predictor for current day fiscal institu-
tions in Africa given that many of these institutions in contemporaneous African states were
established and shaped by the colonizing powers. As the amount of revenues they had to
raise likely depended, at least to some extent, on the threat posed by the colonized people,
i. e. their underlying ability to challenge the colonizers militarily, battle casualties suffered by
the colonizing power can be a reasonable indicator of subsequent buildup of fiscal capacity in
order to deal with such threats.
The results from estimating Model (1) with these instruments are reported in Table 5.
They suggest, first, that there is a positive relationship between the tax revenue to GDP
ratio and both measures of government accountability. Second, they indicate that the income
tax ratio has a positive effect on democracy. The non-grant ratio, however, is not significantly
related to either measure of accountability. Reliance on income taxes and a higher tax intake,
measured with the tax/GDP ratio, thus seems to lead to more democracy and a better quality
of government.
At first sight, these results might lead us to conclude that there is a positive effect of fiscal
capacity on measures of government accountability if the former is measured either by the
income tax ratio or by the total tax intake of the state. However, such a conclusion would
only be warranted if the instruments performed well. Indeed, the diagnostic tests suggests two
problems with these instruments. The first is that they do not seem to be strong predictors of
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the proxies for fiscal capacity. The weak-identification test statistic (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistic) are relatively low in all regressions. The second problem is that the instruments
do not appear to be exogenous in most regressions, as suggested by the significant or almost
significant over-identification tests (Hansen-J).
Overall, the regressions provided in Table 5 indicate that the instrumental variables ap-
proach using war casualties as instruments for fiscal capacity alone is not sufficient to establish
the effect of fiscal capacity on democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. In the next sections, there-
fore, we exploit the temporal dimension of our data to explore this question further.
5 Long-run effects of fiscal capacity and accountability
In this section, we exploit the temporal dimension of our data to identify the effect of fiscal
capacity on government accountability by estimating two sets of cross-section models. In
Section 5.1, we estimate cross-section models where we explain a country’s final level of
the measures of accountability in our dataset by its initial values of the measures of fiscal
capacity. In Section 5.2, we estimate models where we explain the change in the measures of
accountability by the initial values of the measures of fiscal capacity.
5.1 Initial fiscal capacity and final levels of accountability
We begin by estimating the following model
Accountabilityi,t=T = c+ αFiscal capacityi,t=1 + βAccountabilityt=1 + δxi,t=T + ǫi. (2)
Model (2) explains the last available value of the measures of accountability in coun-
try i (Accountabilityi,t=T ) with the first available value of the measures of fiscal capacity
(Fiscal capacityi,t=1). To take account of the effects of the colonial heritage on contempora-
neous levels of fiscal capacity and democracy, we also include the initial level of our proxies
for accountability. That is, we control for initial values of democracy and government quality,
respectively. Further control variables are the last available values of the log of GDP per
capita, the urbanity ratio, and the share of the under-24 year old.
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In Table 6, we report the results from estimating Model (2). We find that the estimated
effect of the income tax ratio on democracy is significantly positive, while it is insignificant
with respect to the quality of government. The coefficient on the tax to GDP ratio is positive
both in the democracy and the quality of government regressions, but only significant in
the latter. Overall, these results suggest that fiscal capacity, if measured by the income tax
ratio or the tax/GDP ratio, is conducive for democratization and the quality of government,
respectively. The significance levels of the coefficients of interest are, however, low in some of
the models.
5.2 Initial levels on subsequent changes
To investigate the temporal relationship between fiscal capacity and accountability further,
we explore whether initial values are related to subsequent changes. The model that we
estimate is
∆Accountabilityi = c+ βFiscal capacityi,t=1 + γAccountabilityi,t=1 + δxi + ǫi, (3)
where ∆Accountability = Accountabilityt=T − Accountabilityt=1 is the difference between
the last and the first available value of the two measures of accountability in country i. All
other variables are defined as in Model (2). The control variables are included as cross-section
averages since we explain changes over relatively long time periods.
In Table 7, we report the results from estimating Model (3). These results are consistent
with those reported in Table 6. Higher initial fiscal capacity, if measured with either the
income tax or the tax to GDP ratio, is generally positively and significantly related to the
change in both democracy and the quality of government. There is also strong evidence
for a reversion to the mean in democracy. Countries with a higher level of democracy or
government quality experienced significant reductions in these dimensions of accountability
during the sample period.
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6 Dynamic panel data models
In this section, we fully exploit the panel structure of the dataset by estimating dynamic
fixed effects models. The advantage of these models is, first, that they can reveal short-term
relationships between fiscal capacity and accountability. Second, we can control for country-
specific time-invariant effects by including cross-section fixed effects, and control for common
shocks by including time fixed effects. The disadvantage is that there might not be sufficient
within-variation to detect any meaningful effects.
We use five and ten-year averaged data to control for short term variability in the fiscal
variables, for example due to business cycle effects (which might lead to imprecise measure-
ment of the fiscal capacity variables and thus to measurement error). To take account of
potential endogeneity between fiscal capacity and accountability, we again exploit the tem-
poral structure of the data and lag the measures of fiscal capacity by one five- or ten-year
period average, respectively. We also include a lagged value of our measure for accountability
to take account of persistence. The model that we finally estimate is
Accountabilityi,t = ci + γt + αFiscal capacityi,t−1 + βAccountabilityi,t−1 + δxi,t + ǫi,t, (4)
where Accountability, Fiscal capacity and x are defined as previously (albeit as five and ten-
year averages, respectively), ci denotes the cross-section fixed effects, γt are time fixed effects,
and ǫ the error term. The t− 1 refer to the previous five or ten year period, respectively.
Models that simultaneously include fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable cannot
be estimated by OLS or an analogous estimator (i. e. the within-estimator) because of the
Nickell-Bias (Nickell, 1981). While Judson and Owen (1999) show that the bias can generally
be ignored when the time dimension is larger than 30, the time dimension here is much lower
than 30 because the data has been averaged over five or ten years, respectively. We therefore
use the System-GMM approach to estimate Model (4).
The results are reported in Table 8. We find that they are largely in line with those in the
previous sections. The income tax ratio, in particular, has a significantly positive effect on
democracy in both the five and ten year average models. In the remaining regressions, the
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coefficients of the fiscal capacity proxies, while not significant, are generally positively related
to the measures of accountability as well.
7 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to explore the effect of fiscal capacity on government accountability
in sub-Saharan Africa. After describing our proxies for fiscal capacity and accountability, we
have explored this issue with the instrumental variables approach. Even though the results
suggested that there is a significantly positive effect of fiscal capacity, i. e. the income tax and
tax revenues to GDP ratio, on proxies for government accountability, we also found that the
instruments are questionable because they were either weak or directly related to both the
proxies for fiscal capacity and accountability. Alternative instruments suffered from similar
problems.
Therefore, we explored the issue further by exploiting the temporal dimension of our
dataset. We found that higher fiscal capacity, if measured by the share of income taxes
in total tax revenue and/or the tax revenues to GDP ratio, leads to higher levels for both
measures of accountability. However, the results were particularly strong when using the
income tax ratio as proxy for fiscal capacity and democracy as proxy for accountability.
The non-grant share of revenues and both measures of accountability, on the other hand,
are unrelated. This may either suggest that this particular variable is not an accurate measure
of fiscal capacity, or that grants have ambiguous effects in Africa. In particular, grant revenue
consists of foreign aid, and it is possible that aid has conflicting effects on public policies. It
may be that, on the one hand, it has harmful consequences by incentivizing rulers to be less
accountable to their citizens since they can get funds from elsewhere. On the other hand,
donor countries may require that governments maintain some minimum degree of account-
ability, both in the dimension of democracy and government quality (Collier, 2006). These
two effects might cancel each other out, leading to statistically insignificant estimates.
While there are, of course, many differences between the development of the modern state in
the West and the state building processes in contemporaneous sub-Saharan Africa, it appears
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that the fundamental relationship between the power and the willingness of the state to tax
and the degree of its accountability to its citizens is present in Africa as well. From a policy
perspective, the results in this paper suggest that investing in fiscal capacity, in particular
by expanding direct taxation and increasing total tax intake, may lead to more accountable
governments. Donors may therefore want to expand projects that address governance and
fiscal capacity simultaneously.
Future work on the themes addressed in this paper involves identifying alternative proxies
for fiscal capacity. While the variables used in this paper have regularly been applied in
the literature, they are nonetheless crude. Replication this study with an indices approach
to measure fiscal capacity, possibly based on surveys of country experts, may provide addi-
tional insights. Second, studies at a more disaggregated level, exploring for example the link
between local taxes and the quality of service delivery, can complement the findings in this
study. Finally, searching for alternative instruments that are more strongly correlated with
the proxies of fiscal capacity and/or accountability might be useful as well.
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Table 1: Countries
Botswana Kenya Uganda
Burkina Faso Madagascar Zambia
Cameroon Mali Zimbabwe
Congo, Dem. Rep. Namibia
Congo, Republic of Niger
Cote d‘Ivoire Senegal
Ethiopia Sierra Leone
Gambia, The South Africa
Ghana Sudan
Guinea Togo
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Table 2: Definition and source of variables
Label Description Source
Measures of fiscal capacity
Income tax ratio Taxes on income, profits and capital gains as % of
total tax revenue
World Development Indica-
tors/ African Development In-
dicators
Tax/GDP ratio Tax revenue as share of GDP World Development Indica-
tors/ African Development In-
dicators
Non-grant ratio Non-grant revenues as share of total revenues
(100%- grants and other revenues/total revenues)
World Development Indica-
tors/ African Development In-
dicators
Measures of accountability
Democracy Combined Polity Score (the sum of the polity au-
tocracy and democracy scores), range -10 – +10,
higher values indicate more democracy
Marshall and Jaggers (2002)
Quality of government ICRG quality of government index PRS Group
Control variables
GDP per capita log of (real) GDP per capita (constant prices,
chain series)
Penn World Table on 6.3
Urbanity 100%-share of rural population African Development Indica-
tors
Young Share of population ≤ 24 African Development Indica-
tors
Instruments
Historical wars Number of extra-state wars (colonial power
against sub-Saharan African Kingdom / Tribe) be-
fore 1945
Own calculations based on
Correlates of War database
Historical war casualties Accumulated state casualties (i. e. casualties suf-
fered by colonial power) in extra-state wars before
1945
Own calculations based on
Correlates of War database
Note: Several of these variables were obtained from Teorell et al. (2010)
Table 3: Cross-correlation table
Democracy Quality of
govern-
ment
Income tax
ratio
Tax/GDP
ratio
Non-grant
ratio
GDP per
capita
Urban Young
Democracy 1.000
Quality of government 0.714 1.000
Income tax ratio 0.569 0.474 1.000
Tax/GDP ratio 0.727 0.779 0.626 1.000
Non-grant ratio -0.001 0.019 0.093 0.316 1.000
GDP per capita 0.401 0.601 0.644 0.619 0.161 1.000
Urban 0.121 0.151 0.338 0.260 0.192 0.603 1.000
Young -0.277 -0.226 0.021 -0.185 -0.224 -0.404 -0.643 1.000
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Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max. N
Democracy -1.907 4.127 -7.805 6.791 23
Quality of government 0.426 0.125 0.123 0.658 23
Income tax ratio 28.036 12.761 10.451 57.754 23
Tax/GDP ratio 14.396 6.531 1.212 28.179 23
Non-grant ratio 73.833 17.626 26.98 92.067 23
GDP per capita 0.578 0.624 -0.197 2.029 23
Urban 27.117 11.078 9.044 51.428 23
Young 63.441 2.322 58.249 67.05 23
Note: Summary statistics for GDP per capita are for logarithmized values
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Table 5: Effect of fiscal capacity on accountability in sub-Saharan
Africa, IV regressions, cross-section averages, 1960-2008
Democracy Quality of government
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z
Income tax ratio 0.233* -0.000
(1.724) (-0.052)
Tax/GDP ratio 0.429*** 0.022***
(2.672) (4.719)
Non-grant ratio 0.070 -0.006
(0.408) (-1.143)
GDP per capita -0.003 0.087 3.216* 0.163* -0.009 0.170***
(-0.001) (0.051) (1.822) (1.751) (-0.148) (3.406)
Urbanity -0.197*** -0.100* -0.151* -0.005** -0.003 -0.005
(-3.025) (-1.820) (-1.755) (-2.306) (-1.272) (-0.868)
Young -1.124*** -0.566*** -0.488 -0.010 -0.010 -0.018
(-4.446) (-2.773) (-1.053) (-0.869) (-1.205) (-0.878)
N 23 23 23 23 23 23
F 13.383 5.618 1.976 6.905 15.993 2.999
RMSE 2.708 2.587 3.804 0.091 0.086 0.125
Overid. test (p-val.) 0.079 0.087 0.085 0.088 0.770 0.156
Weak id. test statistic 3.211 4.250 1.392 3.211 4.250 1.392
a Instrumental variable regressions of the two measures of accountability (democracy, quality of govern-
ment) on the three measures of fiscal capacity (income tax ratio, tax/GDP ratio, non-grant ratio)
b Instruments are number of historical extra-state wars (fought between a colonizing power and native
tribes/kingdoms) and historical extra-state war casualties suffered by the colonial power
c Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***)
d z-statistics in parentheses
e Significance tests based on robust standard errors
f Hansen-J test is used to test for overidentification
g Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used to test for weak identification
Table 6: Effect of initial fiscal capacity on final accountability in sub-
Saharan Africa, 1960-2008
Democracyt=T Quality of governmentt=T
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z
Income tax ratio(t=1) 0.219** -0.001
(2.259) (-0.466)
Tax/GDP ratio(t=1) 0.226 0.006*
(1.039) (1.749)
Non-grant ratio(t=1) -0.005 0.000
(-0.104) (0.317)
Democracy(t=1) -0.158 -0.070 -0.023
(-1.419) (-0.388) (-0.125)
Quality of government (t=1) 0.020 0.001 0.019
(0.186) (0.006) (0.172)
GDP per capita(t=T ) -1.323 0.205 0.780 0.108*** 0.075* 0.096**
(-0.661) (0.087) (0.351) (2.662) (1.859) (2.308)
Urbanity(t=T ) -0.174** -0.143 -0.167* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-2.198) (-1.615) (-1.804) (-0.986) (-0.741) (-0.935)
Young(t=T ) -0.499 -0.354 -0.551 -0.001 0.003 -0.001
(-1.084) (-0.691) (-1.102) (-0.137) (0.291) (-0.055)
N 23 23 23 23 23 23
F 3.367 1.480 0.715 1.985 2.801 1.818
RMSE 4.233 4.477 4.624 0.092 0.087 0.093
R2 0.273 0.186 0.132 0.331 0.402 0.326
a OLS regressions of the final value of the two proxies for accountability on initial values of the three proxies for fiscal
capacity
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***)
c z-statistics in parentheses
d Significance tests based on robust standard errors
Table 7: Effect of initial fiscal capacity on change in accountability in sub-
Saharan Africa, 1960-2008
∆ Democracy ∆ Quality of government
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z
Income tax ratio(t=1) 0.269*** 0.004*
(3.005) (1.793)
Tax/GDP ratio(t=1) 0.280 0.009***
(1.463) (3.141)
Non-grant ratio(t=1) 0.028 0.000
(0.469) (0.139)
Democracy(t=1) -1.178*** -1.053*** -1.010***
(-7.650) (-5.871) (-5.743)
Quality of government(t=1) -0.969*** -0.986*** -0.932***
(-9.280) (-11.073) (-8.127)
GDP per capita -2.501 -0.768 0.723 0.014 0.012 0.064
(-1.226) (-0.297) (0.316) (0.262) (0.291) (1.381)
Urbanity -0.056 0.041 0.058 -0.005* -0.004* -0.004
(-0.410) (0.382) (0.479) (-1.911) (-1.756) (-1.342)
Young -0.245 0.214 0.419 -0.020 -0.016 -0.012
(-0.400) (0.308) (0.638) (-1.303) (-1.468) (-0.757)
N 23 23 23 23 23 23
F 9.894 6.007 5.415 14.867 19.647 10.861
RMSE 4.463 4.654 4.880 0.098 0.089 0.103
R2 0.661 0.631 0.594 0.766 0.808 0.745
a OLS regressions of the long-run changes in government accountability on the initial values of the three proxies for
fiscal capacity
b Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***)
c z-statistics in parentheses
d Significance tests based on robust standard errors
Table 8: Effect of fiscal capacity on government accountability in sub-Saharan Africa, dynamic panel data models, 5 and
10-year averages, 1960-2008
5-y. averages 10-y. averages
Democracy Quality of government Democracy Quality of government
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII)
b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z b/z
Income tax ratiot=−1 0.136** 0.001 0.132* 0.002
(2.185) (0.811) (1.932) (0.500)
Tax/GDP ratio t=−1 0.142 0.005 0.084 -0.002
(1.320) (1.130) (0.530) (-0.155)
Non-grant ratiot=−1 0.018 -0.000 0.023 0.001
(0.867) (-0.088) (0.828) (0.211)
Democracyt=−1 0.439** 0.578*** 0.637*** 0.676** 0.676** 0.677**
(2.158) (3.039) (3.164) (2.081) (2.101) (2.108)
Quality of governmentt=−1 0.403** 0.366*** 0.378*** 1.743 1.642 1.517
(2.422) (2.743) (2.653) (0.942) (1.023) (1.112)
GDP per capita -1.193 -0.258 0.300 0.074* 0.062* 0.089*** -2.917* -1.650 -1.186 -0.160 -0.101 -0.092
(-1.404) (-0.322) (0.276) (1.732) (1.777) (2.665) (-1.907) (-1.278) (-0.706) (-0.489) (-0.541) (-0.442)
Urbanity -0.027 -0.009 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.010 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
(-0.574) (-0.272) (-0.114) (-1.086) (-0.780) (-1.049) (-0.162) (0.122) (0.079) (0.962) (1.051) (1.139)
Young -0.183 -0.070 -0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 -0.168 -0.063 -0.028 0.020 0.021 0.021*
(-1.084) (-0.539) (-0.027) (0.634) (0.806) (0.618) (-0.696) (-0.301) (-0.120) (1.480) (1.624) (1.659)
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 99 100 100 66 66 66 61 61 61 33 33 33
Groups 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 21 21 21
χ2 514.196 762.601 949.480 213.243 356.158 212.207 138.031 142.390 142.352 12.952 16.257 19.202
Overid. test (p-val.) 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.261 0.242 0.219 0.297 0.338 0.358 0.732 0.827 0.763
a Models explaining the effect of the three measures of fiscal capacity in the previous five- or ten-year period, respectively, on the measures of accountability in the current five- or ten-year
period, respectively
b Models are estimated with System-GMM
c Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***)
d z-statistics in parentheses
e Significance tests based on robust standard errors
f Hansen-J test is used to test for overidentification
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Figure 1: Bivariate relationships between measures of fiscal capacity and
democracy
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Figure 2: Bivariate relationships between measures of fiscal capacity and
quality of government
Table 9: Data appendix on historical wars in sub-Saharan Africa (before 1945)
Country Historical wars Historical war casualties Historical war combatants
(suffered by colonizers)
Burkina Faso 0 0 -
Botswana 0 0 -
Cote d‘Ivoire 1 1 Mandino-war 1885 (France - Wassoulou empire)
Cameroon 0 0 -
Congo, Republic of 0 0 -
Ethiopia 4 16.475 British - Ethiopian 1867, Egypt - Ethiopian 1875, Italo
- Ethiopian1887, Italo - Ethiopian 1895
Ghana 3 1.25 British - Ashanti 1824, British - Ashanti 1873, British
- Ashanti 1893
Guinea 1 1 Mandino-war 1885 (France - Wassoulou empire)
Gambia, The 0 0 -
Kenya 0 0 -
Madagascar 2 7 France - Madagascar 1883, France - Madagascar 1894
Mali 1 1 Mandino-war 1885(France-Wassoulou empire)
Namibia 1 2 Germans - Herero & Nama1904
Niger 0 0
Sudan 2 36 Egypt & British - Mahdi 1882, Egypt & British -
Mahdi 1896
Senegal 2 2 France - Senegalese 1857, France - Senegalese 1890
Sierra Leone 1 2 Sierra Leone Rebels - British 1898
Togo 0 0 -
Uganda 0 0 -
South Africa 8 54.3 British - Zulu 1838, British - Kaffir 1846, British -
Kaffir 1850, British - Kaffir 1877, British - Zulu 1879,
British - Transvaal 1880, Boer War 1899, British - Zulu
1906
a Death are scaled in 1000
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